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THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
1790-1990*
I. INTRODUCTION
ANDREW RADDING* *
For two hundred years now the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland has been a theater of daily one-act plays in a
vast American drama. The players have included famous judges,
such as Samuel Chase and Roger Taney; great advocates, such as
Luther Martin and Thurgood Marshall; and obscure litigants, such
as a poor, black sailor named Benjamin Brown and a temperamental
farmer named John Merryman. Unlike the Broadway stage, how-
ever, the characters and stories in a federal district court are not
always dramatic, or even interesting. But over the course of a life
nearly as old as the nation itself, so many stories are recorded
before the court that a selective look back can produce a remarkable
picture of the issues, both large and small, that have occupied our
district and our nation.
The task of organizing the story of the court for its two hun-
dredth anniversary celebration fell upon Judge Frederic N. Smalkin,
who coordinated the event on behalf of the court. Judge Smalkin
asked me to chair a bicentennial celebration committee and to coor-
dinate both the ceremonial and social aspects of the event. Planning
began almost two years in advance of the ceremony. Early in the
process Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist favored us with his ac-
ceptance of Chief Judge Alexander Harvey's invitation to attend.
Since no ChiefJustice had joined and sat with the court in well over
a hundred years, we were pleased to know that our ceremony would
make history as well as celebrate it.
Three different dates in 1790 compete for recognition as the
true beginning of Maryland's federal district court. The committee
decided to celebrate on June 1, which a news report lists as the date
• Adapted from proceedings held June 1, 1990, in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, Baltimore, Md.
•* Principal, Blades & Rosenfeld, P.A.; former President, Federal Bar Association,
Maryland Chapter. J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1968; B.B.A., City College of
New York, 1965.
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the first grand jury was charged.'
In choosing a theme for the ceremony, the committee wanted
to stress the venerable nature of the court without losing sight of the
fact that this was to be a celebration-indeed, a birthday party. Web-
ster's defines the word "venerable" as "calling forth respect through
age, character, and attainments." 2 The age of the court was, of
course, on display. The committee decided to stress the character
of the court's personnel and the importance of its attainments as an
institution in as much detail as practicable in a proceeding of this
type. It was not to be a dry, academic exercise, but a recognition of
a vibrant entity having reached a milestone and planning to carry on
its work in the future.
Under the guidance of Judge Smalkin, the committee decided
that the presentations should trace the history of the court through
significant periods and events in its life. Implementing that plan de-
manded insight, tact, a knowledge of legal history, and a great deal
of good luck. We chose speakers based upon their knowledge or
interest in a particular aspect of our theme. The Chief Justice, an
authority on one of the early participants in the court's history, fit in
perfectly.
Two elements of the bicentennial festivities were not reflected
in the presentations but certainly merit attention. The first was
Bankruptcy Judge James F. Schneider's comprehensive update of
H.H. Walker Lewis's history of the court. This publication, now
called A Bicentennial History of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Mayland, contains a history of the court and biographies of all
its judges and many of its key personnel for the entire two hundred
year period. Anyone involved with the court will cherish Judge
Schneider's extraordinary work.
A number of other people deserve credit for their invaluable
help in staging the ceremony. William Levasseur, a former Federal
Bar Association chapter president, was instrumental in handling the
business and technical side of the publication. In addition, Mr.
Levasseur and his partner, JoAnne Zawitoski, undertook the prepa-
ration of programs, invitations, tickets, and many of the other logis-
tical elements necessary to an undertaking such as this.
The Federal Bar Association sponsored a post-ceremony recep-
tion for members of the bench and bar. Joshua Treem, another for-
mer president of Maryland's chapter of the Federal Bar Association,
1. See infra notes 6, 8.
2. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2540 (1976).
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planned and organized the reception. Douglas Murray and Steven
Bers undertook many of the last minute details of the reception.
When June 1, 1990, finally arrived, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland convened precisely at 4:00 p.m.
Joining the Chief Justice in attendance were hundreds of guests in-
terested in celebrating the court's long life. The crowd was so large
that although the proceedings took place in the ceremonial court-
room, we had to broadcast them on closed circuit television to sev-
eral other courtrooms in order to accommodate all the visitors. The
committee received special permission for this broadcast and vide-
otaping from the court (in itself an historic precedent).
From Chief Judge Harvey's welcoming, to Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's closing, the remarks represented a mix of scholarship, his-
tory, humor, nostalgia, insight, and prediction. In short, the
proceedings ofJune 1, 1990 evoked the broad range of issues, ideas,
and emotions that have constituted the daily life of this court and
the people involved with it for the past two hundred years. These
speeches, with minimal editing and annotation by the staff of the
Maryland Law Review, are presented in the pages that follow. On
behalf of the Federal Bar Association, I hope they inform, entertain,
and inspire all who may one day participate in the ongoing drama of
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
[VOL. 50:40
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II. WELCOME
HONORABLE ALEXANDER HARVEY, 1It
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
This is a truly historic occasion for this court. Today we celebrate the two
hundredth anniversary of the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. To make this event an even more memorable one, the ChiefJustice
of the United States, the Honorable William H. Rehnquist, has honored our
court by joining us on the bench here today. His presence is particularly appre-
ciated in view of the fact that June is perhaps the busiest month of all for the
Supreme Court as the Justices conclude their work for the entire 1989-1990
term. We are delighted that Mrs. Rehnquist could also join us here today.
There are so many federal and state dignitaries present in this courtroom
today that a good part of our program would be used up were I to name them
all. I do want particularly to note the presence of our good friend, United
States Senator Paul Sarbanes. I believe also that Congresswoman Helen Bent-
ley and Congressman Kweisi Mfume are to be here. Attorney General Joseph
Curran, I believe, is here, and we welcome the Mayor of the City of Baltimore.
There are many, many state judges in attendance and we also have our bank-
ruptcy judges and our federal magistrates. We thank you all for coming.
This court was one of the original thirteen district courts created by the
Judiciary Act of 1789, - which became law on September 24, 1789. Later that
year, President George Washington appointed William Paca, previously a gov-
ernor of this state, to be the first judge of this court.4
Scholars have debated whether the first session of the court was held on
April 17, 1790, on June 1, 1790, or in mid-September of 1790.' Unfortu-
nately, the records in the archives were in a state of disarray, leading to the
confusion. According to an account in the Maryland Journal and Balti-
more Advertiser, Judge Paca, on June 1, 1790, borrowed a state courthouse
several blocks from this spot, and convened a session of this court and delivered
"an excellent Charge to the grand jury. "6 Two hundred years later we sit here
as a court composed of nine active judges and five senior judges. 7
t Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Chief
Judge Harvey's remarks appear in italics throughout the Article.
3. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
4. H.H.W. LEWIS, THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT COURT OF MARYLAND 6 (1977).
5. See infra notes 8, 35.
6. See The Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, June 4, 1790, at 2, col. 1; id.,
May 11, 1790, at 3, col. 1 (listing the "first Jury under the Authority of the United States,
in this State" in a session at Annapolis).
7. The nine active judges are Alexander Harvey, II (Chief);Joseph C. Howard, Nor-
man Park Ramsey, Walter E. Black, Jr., John R. Hargrove, J. Frederick Motz, Frederic N.
Smalkin, MarvinJ. Garbis, and William M. Nickerson. The senior judges are Roszel C.
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We who sit here today are proud of the part that this court has played in
the lives of the citizens of this state during the past two hundred years.
Through today's celebration of our bicentennial, we seek to recognize anew and
underscore for future generations the values exemplified by the dedicated service
of our predecessor judges in administering justice in this court. We look for-
ward to the court's third century.
To commence these proceedings, I will ask Joseph A. Haas, Esquire, our
Clerk of the Court, to read minutes we have located pertaining to a session of
court held on April 17, 1790, which we now believe to be the first one.8 Mr.
Haas.
The District of Maryland, to wit,
At an Admiralty Court of the United States held for
the said District of Maryland at Baltimore town on the sev-
enteenth day of April in the year of our LORD one thou-
sand seven hundred and ninety was present
The Honorable William Paca Esquire, Nathaniel Ram-
say Esq., Marshall Joshua Barney Clk.
Robert Smith, Esq. appeared and qualified as a practi-
tioner of the Court by taking the Oath prescribed by Act of
Congress in that case made and provided.
Daniel Dennis was appointed Cryer
The Court adjourned untill the nineteenth instant.9
Thank you, Mr. Haas. Would that our sessions were as brief today. Our
program today consists of remarks by judges of this court and active practition-
ers, and we will also be hearing from the Chief Justice. These speakers will
discuss aspects of the court's history during the past two hundred years as well
as prospects for the future.
Thomsen, Edward S. Northrop, Frank A. Kaufman, Joseph H. Young, and Herbert F.
Murray.
8. Minutes of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, 1790-1911, Apr.
17, 1790 (not paginated) (available in National Archives, Philadelphia) [hereinafter Min-
ute Book]. The earliest minutes of the court appear in the middle rather than at the
beginning of the book, probably due to an error by the binder.
9. Id.
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III. EARLIEST ACTIVITIES AS A COURT OF ADMIRALTY
DAVID R. OWEN
Our first speaker is David R. Owen, Esquire, a retired partner
of the Baltimore law firm of Semmes, Bowen & Semmes. Mr. Owen
has served in the past as president of the Maritime Law Association
and for many years was an active admiralty practitioner in this
court. Among his clients some years ago was Baltimore's own na-
tionally known journalist, H.L. Mencken. It is with great pleasure
that I recognize Mr. Owen.
Mr. Chief Justice, judges of our court, honored guests.
The first entry in the minutes of this court tells a great deal
about the nature of its business in its early years. The minute book
recites: "The District of Maryland, to wit, At an Admiralty Court of
the United States held for the said District of Maryland at Baltimore
Town on [April 17, 1790]."' t
It was no accident that the court commenced as a court of admi-
ralty. The original motivation of the framers of the Constitution
was summarized by the Virginia legislature in a prospectus calling
for a preliminary convention to be held in Annapolis in 1786:11 "to
consider how far a uniform system [of] commercial regulations may
be necessary."12
Article III of the Constitution extended the judicial power of
the United States "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion."" The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the district courts and
the circuit courts.' 4 The trial courts of general civil and criminal
jurisdiction were the circuit courts, which existed until 1911. The
district courts were given "exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."' 5 This included all
seizures of vessels and cargoes for violation of the customs and navi-
10. Minute Book, supra note 8, Apr. 17, 1790.
11. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 15 (1928).
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. See generally Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given
AdmirallyJurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 465-69 (1925) (describing the drafting of the
admiralty clause).
14. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 74 (creating the district courts); id.
§ 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75 (creating the circuit courts).
15. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77. During the Senate debates Senator Richard Henry Lee of
Virginia went so far as to argue that the jurisdiction of the district courts should be
"confined" to admiralty and maritime cases. See W. MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATE IN
THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1789-90-91, at 86-87 (1880 & photo. reprint
1969). As for the development of the admiralty jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act, see
Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 60
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gation laws.' 6
Other jurisdictions related to the sea included the exclusive
cognizance of all suits against foreign consuls.' 7 The district courts
also had jurisdiction, concurrent with the circuit courts, of certain
minor crimes, including those committed on the high seas, for
which the punishment was not more than thirty lashes.' 8 The dis-
trict courts had no equity jurisdiction, and their jurisdiction in com-
mon-law cases, concurrent with the circuit courts, was limited to
suits by the United States for sums exceeding $100.' 9
Interestingly, our court's first judge and first clerk each had a
maritime background. Judge William Paca had practiced in the co-
lonial Court of Vice Admiralty, where there is a record of his having
represented a group of unpaid seaman in a suit against their ship
and master.20 Co-counsel was none other than the famous, or as
Mr. Jefferson would have said, notorious Samuel Chase,2' later a
Justice of the Supreme Court.
Paca had also been for two years a judge of the Court of Ap-
peals in cases of capture,22 a court established by the Continental
Congress in 1780 to try the prize cases that arose out of the various
wars going on at that time, including the American Revolution.23
This was the first federal court-not under the Constitution, but
under the Articles of Confederation.24
The clerk, Joshua Barney, was one of the great naval heroes of
the Revolution and the War of 1812.25 He had been a captain in the
Pennsylvania Navy and a privateer captain with a brilliant record of
n.29, 67, 74-75 (1923). Congressman Tucker of Virginia made the same arguments in
the House as Lee had in the Senate. Id. at 123-24.
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 76-77.
19. Id. at 77. For a summary of the jurisdiction of the district courts created in the
Judiciary Act, and its expansion by later statutes, see E. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FED-
ERAL COURTS 95-110 (1987). For a discussion of admiralty jurisdiction, see id. at 145-
54.
20. Henry Edwards v. The Snow Hannah, Edward Prescott, Commander, Court of
Vice Admiralty Record Book at 25a-39b, 63, Sept. 19, 1763 (Admiralty Court Minutes,
Series No. S117, 1754-1773, Location 1-6-S-21, Hall of Records, Annapolis, Md.).
They had "jumped ship" because of the alleged "repeated Barbarity, Inhumanity and
Ill/usage" of the master and mate. Id. at 62.
21. Id. at 63. For a discussion of Justice Chase, see infra Part X.
22. H. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT 116-17 (1977).
23. Id. at 116-21.
24. Id. at 113.
25. See I DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 632-35 (A. Johnson ed. 1964).
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victories at sea.2 6 At the age of thirty, he accepted the unsolicited
appointment as first clerk of this court.2 ' After serving for three
years, he announced that his health had been impaired by his so-
journ ashore and that he wished to return to sea. He later became a
commodore in the French Navy and then a captain in the United
States Navy and was the hero of the Battle of Bladensburg in Mary-
land in 1814.28
As clerk, Barney reversed the aphorism "the pen is mightier
than the sword." Although he was very adept with sword and pistol,
he was a very poor record keeper. In fact, his very first entry in the
minute book (following the opening session notes) was erroneous in
that he dated it 1791 instead of 1790.29 Later entries bear Barney's
name, but not in his handwriting, and by August 1791, the minutes
were being signed: "Test forJ. Barney Clk, J. Winchester, junr."' °
James H. Winchester (presumably the same man) became the sec-
ond judge of the court."'
During the court's first fifty years at least ninety percent of its
business was admiralty. About two-thirds of the admiralty actions
were suits by seamen for unpaid wages.32 Indeed, the very first case,
tried on April 19, 1790, was a series of twelve complaints (called
"libels" in admiralty) by seamen against the brigantineJulianna for
unpaid wages.33 The vessel was arrested, condemned, and sold.34
The pleading filed in that first case is in excellent condition. It is
signed by Robert Smith, the first attorney admitted to practice in the
court.
3 5
In those days there were also a substantial number of libels filed
by the United States against ships or cargoes for violation of cus-
toms or navigation acts. On the second trial day, August 2, 1790,
26. Id.
27. A BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF THE LATE COMMODORE JOSHUA BARNEY 161 (M. Bar-
ney ed., Boston 1832). The author was Barney's daughter-in-law and the daughter of
Samuel Chase. No other mention of Barney's clerkship has been found.
28. See I DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 634-35 (A. Johnson ed. 1964).
29. Minute Book, supra note 8, Apr. 19, 1790.
30. See, e.g., id., Aug. 26, 1791.
31. See H.H.W. LEwis, supra note 4, at 17.
32. Author's estimate based on examination of original court papers. See generally
Minute Book, supra note 8.
33. Minute Book, supra note 8, Apr. 19, 1790.
34. Id.
35. See Letter from Robert Smith to Hon. William Paca, Esq., filed Apr. 10, 1790 (in
the custody of the Clerk's Office, United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land). Judge Frederic N. Smalkin recently discovered the original papers in the court's
vault.
1991]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the court heard seven of these forfeiture cases.3 6
The remaining admiralty cases during the period involved
prize, collision, salvage, repairs, charter parties, bottomry bonds (an
ancient form of ship mortgage), and quite a number of actions by
seamen for assault and battery committed by masters and mates.37
The assault and battery actions were the only type of maritime per-
sonal injury suit known at that time.
The only nonadmiralty cases were suits by the United States for
small debts.3" Naturalization proceedings were quite numerous.3 9
Until 1863, when a criminal case first was officially reported,4 ° every
single opinion from this court published in the Federal Cases volumes
involved the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.4
During Judge Paca's ten years on the bench, no formal opinions
were reported. One of his cases, however, went to the Supreme
Court. The sloop Betsey was brought to Baltimore as a prize. Paca
had held that the district court had no jurisdiction in a prize case. In
a leading opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction encompassed prize as
well as commercial cases.42
In 1799 James H. Winchester, then aged twenty-seven, became
judge. Judge Winchester made notable contributions to the mari-
time law. Six of his opinions are reported in the Federal Cases
volumes. 43 One of these went to the Supreme Court, which af-
firmed him in an opinion that became the very basis for the Ameri-
can law of marine salvage.44 Another of Judge Winchester's
opinions broke new ground by departing from English precedent
36. Minute Book, supra note 8, Aug. 2, 1790.
37. Based on author's examination of original court papers. See generally Minute
Book, supra note 8.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. United States v. Cashiel, 25 F. Cas. 318 (D. Md. 1863) (No. 14,744).
41. Compare United States v. Benjamin Brown (an unpublished 1860 criminal prose-
cution for manslaughter on a ship at sea, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 86-
89).
42. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794). In England, prize and
commercial cases were heard by the same judge in the same court but the jurisdictions
were technically distinct. H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 22, at 14.
43. United States v. Vickery, 28 F. Cas. 374 (C.C.D. Md. 1803) (No. 16,619); Mason
v. The Blaireau, 16 F. Cas. 1009 (C.C.D. Md. 1803) (No. 9230), af'd, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
240 (1804); Anonymous, 1 F. Cas. 1004 (D. Md. 1808) (No. 449); Stevens v. The Sand-
wich, 23 F. Cas. 29 (D. Md. 1801) (No. 13,409); United States v. Owners of The Unicorn,
27 F. Cas. 393 (D. Md. 1796) (No. 15,979a); United States v. Barney, 24 F. Cas. 1014 (D.
Md., undated) (No. 14,525).
44. See Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804).
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and recognizing a broad constitutional admiralty jurisdiction that
encompassed certain contracts made on land.45
Fourteen years later, Justice Joseph Story, our greatest admi-
ralty judge, reached the same result in the most important of all
American admiralty decisions, De Lovio v. Boit.46 He cited Judge
Winchester's decision three times in his opinion, referring to him
each time as "Mr. Justice" Winchester,47 a title used in federal
courts only to identify Justices of the Supreme Court. Justice Story
concluded, "I know not any man in the United States, who seems to
have had more profound and accurate views of the admiralty juris-
diction, than this very ablejudge."4  "Mr.Justice" Winchester died
in 1806, aged thirty-three.49 The portrait committee has, unfortu-
nately, been unable to locate any likeness of either Judge
Winchester or of his successor, James Houston.
The predominance of admiralty business continued under
Houston, but the proportion of prize cases increased as a result of
the war with Britain. Houston produced no published opinions, but
three of his cases went to the Supreme Court.5 ° Two involved
prize, 5' and the third, in which the Court reversed Houston, became
a leading but much criticized case on maritime liens.52
In 1842 the criminal jurisdiction of the district court was greatly
expanded by Congress,53 and thereafter it ceased to be predomi-
nantly an admiralty court and gradually became a court of general
civil and criminal jurisdiction. In 1989 less than two percent of all
civil cases filed in this court were labeled "marine." ' But the admi-
45. See Stevens, 23 F. Cas. at 30-31.
46. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (extending admiralty jurisdiction
over all maritime contracts).
47. Id. at 441 n.43, 443.
48. Id. at 441 n.43.
49. See H.H.W. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 18.
50. The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819); The Anne, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 436 (1818); The Anna Maria, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 327 (1817).
51. The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 436; The Anna Maria, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 327.
52. The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (opinion by Story, J.). In 1910 this
decision was overruled by Congress and Judge Houston's views on maritime liens were
enacted. See Act of June 23, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-259, ch. 373, §§ 1-5, 36 Stat. 604
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A. 31341-43 (West 1990)); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 642-53 (2d ed. 1975) (discussing the problems caused by The
General Smith decision and calling it one of the two "most ill-advised admiralty deci-
sion[s] ever handed down by the Supreme Court.").
53. Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 3, 5 Stat. 516, 517 (giving concurrent jurisdic-
tion to district and circuit courts over all noncapital federal crimes).
54. See 1989 DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 186.
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ralty courts are more than 2000 years old,55 twice the age of the
common law, and my humble prediction is that they will survive.
Thank you.
55. See E. COHEN, ANCIENT ATHENIAN MARITIME COURTS 8 (1973).
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IV. THE COURT IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA
HONORABLE JAMES F. SCHNEIDER
We will next hear from Bankruptcy Judge James F. Schneider.
Formerly General Equity Master to the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City, Judge Schneider became a bankruptcy judge of this court on
February 1, 1982. He is recognized throughout the state as a legal
historian of considerable note and most recently he has brought up to
date Walker Lewis's 1977 history of this court. From 1985 to
1987, Judge Schneider served as chairman of the State Bar Associa-
tion's Special Committee for the Celebration of the Bicentennial of
the Constitution.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in honoring us today with your pres-
ence at this special ceremony, you have resurrected a lost tradition
as old as the federal courts. Two hundred and one years ago, the
first Congress under the Constitution created the United States dis-
trict courts and decreed that Justices of the Supreme Court should
sit with them twice a year as circuit court justices. 56 Your visit re-
minds us of the days before and during the Civil War when Roger
Brooke Taney, fifth Chief Justice of the United States and a Mary-
lander, often presided with this court as a circuit justice. Congress
did not relieve the Justices of the Supreme Court of the burden of
riding circuit until 1869, when full-time circuit judgeships were cre-
ated." So this is perhaps a tradition you would not wish to revive.
The American Civil War was fought not only to save the Union
and free the slaves, but also to vindicate a principle. That principle
is emblazoned upon the base of the pediment of the Supreme Court
building in this simple four-word inscription: "EQUAL JUSTICE
UNDER LAW."
One hundred thirty years ago, on the eve of the Civil War, the
federal courts were already seventy years old. There were only
forty-five United States district judges in the entire country.5 8 To-
day there are 575.59
William Fell Giles was only the eighth district judge to serve in
Maryland during the first ninety years of this court.6 ° It was not
until 1927 that the membership of the court was enlarged to two
56. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74-75.
57. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45.
58. R. WHEELER & C. HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERALJUDICIAL SYSTEM 19 (1989).
59. Id. at 30.
60. H.H.W. LEWIS &J. SCHNEIDER, A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 1790-1990, at 163 (1990).
1991]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
judges, and not until 1961 that the third and fourth district judge-
ships were created. 6' Judge Giles served from 1853 until his death
in 1879, a year before the advent of the Federal Reporter system.62
But fifty-eight of Judge Giles's decisions are collected in the thirty
volumes of Federal Cases, which predate the Reporter. Of these, fifteen
decisions dealt with bankruptcy and insolvency, 6 thirteen with ad-
miralty, 4 and ten with patent and trademark infringement.65 At the
time cases involving human rights were rare.
And yet it was a case brought by a former slave to secure his
rights as a free man and a citizen that nearly destroyed the prestige
of the federal courts and helped incite the Civil War. The Dred
SCott6 6 decision in 1857 tarnished the reputation of ChiefJustice Ta-
ney and inflamed the North. It held that a black person could not be
61. Id. at 62, 94.
62. Id. at 41.
63. Shaum v. Baker, 21 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D. Md. 1874) (No. 12,440); In re Baltimore
County Dairy Ass'n, 2 F. Cas. 572 (D. Md. 1877) (No. 828); In re Kirkland, 14 F. Cas. 679
(D. Md. 1876) (No. 7844); In re Noakes, 18 F. Cas. 281 (D. Md. 1873) (No. 10,281); In re
Howard, 12 F. Cas. 74 (D. Md. 1873) (No. 6751); Dundore v. Coates, 8 F. Cas. 33 (D.
Md. 1873) (No. 4142); In re Price, 19 F. Cas. 1314 (D. Md. 1872) (No. 11,410); Shaffer v.
Fritchery, 21 F. Cas. 1147 (D. Md. 1871) (No. 12,697); In re Howard, 12 F. Cas 625 (D.
Md. 1871) (No. 6750); In re Rose, 20 F. Cas. 1176 (D. Md. 1869) (No. 12,043); In re
Wylie, 30 F. Cas. 731 (D. Md. 1868) (No. 18,109); In re Lawson, 15 F. Cas. 88 (D. Md.
1868) (No. 8150); In re Lawson, 15 F. Cas. 87 (D. Md. 1868) (No. 8149); In re Bowie, 3 F.
Cas. 1067 (D. Md. 1868) (No. 1728); In re Purvis, 20 F. Cas. 74 (D. Md. 1867) (No.
11,476).
64. Hatton v. The Melita, 11 F. Cas. 827 (D. Md. 1880) (No. 6218); United States v.
Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1111 (D. Md. 1877) (No. 14,574); United States v. The Cuba, 25 F.
Cas. 716 (D. Md. 1869) (No. 14,898); Deely v. The Earnest & Alice, 7 F. Cas. 345 (D.
Md. 1868) (No. 3735); United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1320 (D. Md. 1868) (No.
15,812); United States v. The Francis Hatch, 25 F. Cas. 1201 (D. Md. 1864) (No.
15,158); United States v. The Arcola, 24 F. Cas. 849 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 14,464a);
United States v. The F.W. Johnson, 25 F. Cas. 1232 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 15,179); Haney
v. The Louisiana, 11 F. Cas. 423 (D. Md. 1858) (No. 6020); Philadelphia & Havre de
Grace Steam Tow-Boat Co. v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. Co., 19 F. Cas. 474 (D. Md.
1857) (No. 11,085); United States v. The Anna, 24 F. Cas. 818 (D. Md. 1854) (No.
14,457); Reeder v. The George's Creek, 20 F. Cas. 453 (D. Md. 1854) (No. 11,654);
United States v. The Neptune, 27 F. Cas. 89 (D. Md. 1854) (No. 15,865).
65. Odorless Excavating Apparatus Co. v. McCauley, 18 F. Cas. 589 (C.C.D. Md.
1877) (No. 10,436); Myers v. Duker, 17 F. Cas. 1108 (C.C.D. Md. 1874) (No. 9989);
Alleghany Fertilizer Co. v. Woodside, 1 F. Cas. 429 (C.C.D. Md. 1871) (No. 206); Du-
bois v. Philadelphia W. & B. R.R. Co., 7 F. Cas. 1140 (C.C.D. Md. 1871) (No. 4109);
Johnson v. Onion, 13 F. Cas. 777 (C.C.D. Md. 1870) (No. 7401); Woodward v. Dins-
more, 30 F. Cas. 549 (C.C.D. Md. 1870) (No. 18,003); Cleveland v. Towle, 5 F. Cas.
1038 (C.C.D. Md. 1869) (No. 2888); Hoffeins v. Brandt, 12 F. Cas. 290 (C.C.D. Md.
1867) (No. 6575); Singer v. Walmsley, 22 F. Cas. 207 (C.C.D. Md. 1860) (No. 12,900);
Day v. Stellman, 7 F. Cas. 262 (C.C.D. Md. 1859) (No. 3690).
66. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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a citizen of the United States and could not sue in a federal court,67
and proclaimed in dicta that under the Constitution, Congress was
powerless to prohibit slavery in the territories." The essence of
Dred Scott was that slavery could not be stopped by peaceful, legal
means.
By 1860, the nation was poised on the brink of sectional con-
flict. The census that year counted the American population at 31.5
million, nearly 4 million of whom were black slaves.69 In November,
Abraham Lincoln was elected president. The following month
South Carolina became the first state to secede from the Union. In
discharging a federal grand jury that year, Judge Giles expressed his
deepest fears for the future of the country.
The next term of this Court will be in March 1861 and it
may be that ere that period rolls around, this great and no-
ble Government under which, as a people, we have ad-
vanced to our present high position amid the nations of the
earth... shall have been broken up, and you may be the
last Grand Jury of these present United States which may ever
assemble in this district. 70
The following year the first blood of the Civil War was shed just
beyond the walls of this court on Pratt Street. It was April 19, 1861,
five days after the fall of Fort Sumter, when an angry mob attacked
Northern troops streaming through the city on their way to defend
the national capital. Shots were fired, and when the "Battle of Pratt
Street" was over, twelve civilians and four soldiers of the Sixth Mas-
sachusetts Regiment lay dead.7'
Because of its proximity to Washington, D.C., Maryland's loy-
alty to the Union was essential. On the night of May 13, 1861,
Northern troops seized Federal Hill overlooking the Inner Har-
bor.7 2 For the rest of the war Baltimore was an occupied city. 73 The
Union government declared martial law and suspended the writ of
67. Id. at 406.
68. Id. at 452.
69. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1790, at 15, 18 (1975).
70. Address by W. Calvin Chesnut on the History of the Federal Courts in Maryland
(July 3, 1936), reprinted in, MD. STATE BAR ASS'N, REP. OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANN. MEETING
OF THE MD. STATE BAR ASS'N 63, 81 (1936) (emphasis in original).
71. G. BROWN, BALTIMORE AND THE NINETEENTH OF APRIL, 1861, at 53 (1887).
72. W. LEwIs, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: A BIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER
BROOKtE TANEY 450 (1965).
73. See MD. HISTORICAL SOC'Y, MARYLAND: A HISTORY 1632-1974, at 344-77 (R.
Walsh & W. Fox ed. 1974).
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habeas corpus."4 Soon the federal court clashed with the military
over arbitrary arrests of citizens. Many of these were imprisoned at
Fort McHenry, including the Mayor, the Chief of Police, newspaper
editors, and a Baltimore County farmer named John Merryman.7 5
Walker Lewis has ranked Ex parte Mertyman76 as Maryland's
most famous federal case-and rightly so." Every lawyer should
know the story of John Merryman's imprisonment without trial on
suspicion of sabotaging railroad bridges just after the Pratt Street
riot.7 8 On May 27, 1861, ChiefJustice Taney, then eighty-four years
old, sitting with Judge Giles as a circuit justice in the old Masonic
Temple on St. Paul Street, challenged President Lincoln's suspen-
sion of the writ of habeas corpus without congressional sanction. 79
It has been written that:
Taney's action in this case was worthy of the best traditions
of the Anglo-Saxon judiciary. There is no sublimer picture
in our history than this of the aged Chief-Justice-the fires
of Civil War kindling around him, ... serene and unafraid,
... interposing the shield of the law in the defense of the
liberty of the citizen.80
Few realize that three weeks earlier, Judge Giles had issued a
writ of habeas corpus to effect the release of an underaged recruit
from Fort McHenry in the case of Ex parte John G. Mullen."' When
the writ was dishonored, Judge Giles wrote that it was the first occa-
sion in his thirty-three year legal career that such a thing had oc-
curred. 2 It proved how low the authority of the courts had fallen
after the Dred Scott decision.8 5
President Lincoln had determined that the cost of preserving
the Union was worth the sacrifice of the historic writ. Were all the
laws of the Union save this one to go unexecuted?84 The President
74. W. LEWIS, supra note 72, at 449.
75. SeeJ. SCHARF, 1 HISTORY OF BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTY 141 (1971).
76. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
77. See H.H.W. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 50.
78. See generally W. LEWIS, supra note 72, at 446-55.
79. See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149.
80. Mikell, Roger Brooke Taney, in 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 188-89 (W. Lewis ed.
1908).
81. See The Sun (Baltimore), May 6, 1861, at 4, col. 5.
82. Id.
83. See G. JOHNSON, THE SUPREME COURT 79-82 (1962).
84. See Address of Abraham Lincoln to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861,
reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (R. Basler ed. 1953)
("[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces,
lest that one be violated?").
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believed his paramount duty was to save the country.8 5
Among the most treasured documents preserved in our clerk's
office is a handwritten pardon of a man named Benjamin Brown
signed by Abraham Lincoln. If the Merryman case is Maryland's
most famous federal case, then United States v. Benjamin Brown must
be its most obscure one. The case concerned a young black man
convicted by a federal jury in Baltimore of manslaughter in the
death of a shipmate aboard an American ship at anchor in Peruvian
waters.8 6 Brown was nineteen years old in April 1860 when Judge
Giles sentenced him to three years' imprisonment in the Baltimore
City Jail and a fine of one dollar.8" At the end of his prison term,
Brown was still confined because he was unable to pay the fine. 8
Judge Giles had no power to revise or commute the sentence, but he
wrote to President Lincoln certifying that the prisoner was penniless
and recommending executive clemency.8 9
President Lincoln issued a pardon onJune 18, 1863, a scant two
weeks before the Battle of Gettysburg.9" General Lee was invading
85. Id. at 429-31.
86. The Sun (Baltimore), Apr. 14, 1860, at 1, col. 6.
87. Id., Apr. 24, 1860, at 1, col. 7.
88. See President Lincoln's Pardon of Benjamin Brown, June 18, 1863, reprinted infra,
at note 90 (original is in the custody of the Clerk's Office, United States District Court
for the District of Maryland).
89. See id.
90. Id. The pardon reads as follows:
Abraham Lincoln
President of the United States of America. To all to whom these Presents shall
come, Greeting:
Whereas, at the April Term, A.D. 1860, of the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Maryland, one Benjamin Brown, colored, was con-
victed of manslaughter, and sentenced to imprisonment for the term of three
years, and to pay a fine of one dollar and and [sic] the costs of prosecution;-
And whereas, the said Benjamin Brown has now served out his said term
of imprisonment, conducting himself in a penitent and exemplary manner, and
is now detained for non-payment of the aforesaid fine and costs;-
And whereas, the Hon. William F. Giles, Judge, and William Price, Esq.,
U.S. Attorney, of the United States Court for the said District, do certify that
the said Benjamin Brown is penniless, and that a full enforcement of his sen-
tence would amount to imprisonment for life, and do therefore recommend
him to Executive clemency;-
Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States of America, in consideration of the premises, divers other good
and sufficient reasons me thereunto moving, have granted and do hereby grant
unto him, the said Benjamin Brown, a full and unconditional pardon.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name and caused the
Seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the City of Washington, this
Eighteenth day of June, A.D. 1863, and of the Independence of the United
States the Eighty-seventh.
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the North, and Washington, D.C. stood in peril of attack. And yet at
that hour of maximum danger, the President of the United States
still found time to grant freedom to an impoverished prisoner in the
Baltimore City Jail.
The Civil War was our greatest national tragedy. In four terri-
ble years, the war claimed the lives of 600,000 Americans. 91 It was a
time in which our national will was tested. The war stretched our
Constitution to the breaking point, but cleansed it of the scourge of
slavery. The final outcome, in Lincoln's words at Gettysburg, meant
"that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall
not perish from the earth. ' 92
At the opening session of this court on Monday morning, April
17, 1865, William Price, the United States District Attorney, sol-
emnly announced the death of Abraham Lincoln.9" The court then
adjourned out of respect for his memory.94 Judge William Giles
later said that "To live in the memory of those who shall survive us,
is not to die."95 If that sentiment be true, then today, on this occa-
sion and in this place, the spirit of these great men lives still.
Thank you.
/s/ Abraham Lincoln
By the President
/s/ William H. Seward,
Secretary of State
91. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE DIVIDED UNION 531 (1961).
92. A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in 7 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22-23 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
93. Minute Book, supra note 8, Apr. 17, 1865.
94. Id.
95. W. GILES, ANNUAL ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCI-
ETY ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 17TH, 1866, at 3 (Baltimore 1867).
[VOL. 50:40
BICENTENNIAL
V. INTEGRATION OF THE BAR AND BENCH AND CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION
STUART 0. SIMMS
Our next speaker will be Stuart 0. Simms, Esquire, the State's
Attorney for Baltimore City. Mr. Simms is well known to this court,
having served as an Assistant United States Attorney and having
tried many criminal cases before our judges. He joined the Baltimore
City Office of the State's Attorney in 1983, and became State's A ttor-
neyfor the city in 1987. We are delighted that he has returned to
join us once again here on the federal side and that he will be speak-
ing to us on this occasion.
May it please the court, Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Chief
Judge Harvey and honorable judges of the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, all members of the judiciary,
other dignitaries and guests, good afternoon.
A decade ago, May 16, 1980, at 3:00 p.m., a statue in the rear of
this building was dedicated.96 The person who is represented by
the statue was here that day, Justice Thurgood Marshall. It was the
first time I had ever seen him. As he visited Baltimore on that day,
along with some of his associate justices and other dignitaries, my
thoughts briefly turned to the events enabling him to occupy his po-
sition and to the history of this court and the community it serves.
According to David Bogen, a professor at the University of
Maryland School of Law, prior to the Civil War the State of Mary-
land statutorily restricted the practice of law to white males. 97 Nev-
ertheless, in 1857, Judge Z. Collins Lee of the Baltimore Superior
Court examined Edward Garrison Draper, a black graduate of
Dartmouth College who had studied law in the offices of a retired
Baltimore lawyer. 98 Judge Lee furnished Draper with a certificate
attesting that he was "qualified in all respects to be admitted to the
Bar in Maryland, if he was a free white citizen of this State."
Black citizens actually began to practice in the federal court in
this district prior to their admission to the Maryland State Bar.
James Harris Wolff became the first black attorney admitted to prac-
tice in the federal court when he came to Maryland for a short pe-
96. See The Sun (Baltimore), May 17, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
97. See Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admis-
sion of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 982 & n.126 (1985).
98. Id. at 983-84 & n.132.
99. Id. at 984 n.132.
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riod following his graduation from Harvard Law School in 1875.1
He was soon followed by Charles S. Taylor, another black lawyer
from Massachusetts who had been admitted to the federal bar.' 0 '
Taylor applied for and was denied admission to the bar of Mary-
land. 0 2 EverettJ. Waring, a graduate of Howard Law School, be-
came the first black attorney admitted to the bar of Maryland on
October 10, 1885.103
This court over the years has been a forum for change. In
1953, a suit was filed in this court on behalf of Robert M. Dawson,
Jr., against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore."° That action
challenged as unconstitutional the practice of racial segregation of
public beaches, parks, and bath houses."15 The plaintiffs were rep-
resented by giants of history: Robert L. Carter, Jack Greenberg,
Thurgood Marshall, and Linwood Koger, Jr. and Tucker Dearing of
the Monumental City Bar Association, an association created in
1935 by black attorneys in the State of Maryland. In that case an
appellate court observed that it was "obvious that racial segregation
in recreational activities can no longer be sustained as proper exer-
cise of the police power of this state."'10 6
In 1972, four black Baltimore City firefighters filed a class
action suit in this court against the Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more, who had rejected prior efforts of black firefighters to elimi-
nate racial discrimination in hiring, assignments, promotion, and
other conditions of employment.' 0 7 That litigation resulted in the
recognition by this court that the city of Baltimore had engaged in a
pattern and practice of discrimination and, therefore, the court re-
quired the city to give preference in hiring to city residents as long
as qualified city applicants were available.1'0
The year 1973 saw the filing of another class action suit in this
court against the police commissioner and various city officials,
charging a pattern and practice of racial and sex discrimination in
the day-to-day operation of the Baltimore City Police Depart-
100. Id. at 1032 n.311.
101. See id. at 1032.
102. See In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28, 33 (1877) (upholding as constitutional a statute that
limited the Maryland bar to white males).
103. A. KOGER, THE NEGRO LAWYER IN MARYLAND 7 (1948).
104. See Lonesome v. Maxwell, 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), rev'd sub nom., Dawson
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
105. Id. at 194.
106. Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
107. See Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973).
108. Id. at 1218.
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ment.'0 9 In 1979 this court concluded that the defendants had
indeed engaged in a pattern and practice of racial and sex discrimi-
nation and enjoined the defendants from further discriminatory
acts.' 0 Five black police sergeants were promoted to the rank of
lieutenant, fifty-five black police officers were promoted to the rank
of sergeant-all with back pay-and the court enjoined racially dis-
criminatory testing."1 '
Time does not allow a recitation of all the deeds of this court,
from the Eastern Shore to the Western Shore to the City of Balti-
more. But it is worthy of note that just slightly over a decade ago
this bench was joined by its first black jurists (and my mentors),
Judges Joseph C. Howard and John R. Hargrove, and later by Shir-
ley Jones, the first female. 1 2 We owe praise to people like Presi-
dents Carter and Reagan who stepped forward to nominate them,
and to others such as Senators Sarbanes and Mathias, who stepped
forward to endorse them.
Throughout the history of the bench of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland, its judges and the attorneys
before them have been involved in litigation that has significantly
advanced not just abstract legal theory, but the quality of living of
people who may have thought of themselves as the disconnected.
This court, as well as the other courts in this system, is inextri-
cably bound to the legacies which flow from, to, and around free-
dom fighters and attorneys such as Justice Thurgood Marshall. For
the next two hundred years we look forward to more like him and
for the next two hundred years, we look forward to more from this
bench.
Thank you very much.
109. See Vanguard Justice Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670 (1979).
110. Id. at 710, 717, 725-26, 742 (D. Md. 1979).
111. Information obtained from author's conversations with counsel in Vanguard Jus-
tice Soc'y.
112. See H.H.W. LEwis &J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 60, at 128, 131, 143.
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VI. RECOLLECTIONS OF EARLY JUDGES
J. COOKMAN BOYD, JR.
We will next hearfromJ. Cookman Boyd, Jr., Esquire, a part-
ner in the Baltimore law firm of Boyd, Benson & Hendrickson. Mr.
Boyd has been trying cases in federal court since the early 1930s and
he has given no indication that he will stop being an active practi-
tioner. * He is known to have a vast store of anecdotes pertaining to
judges of this court and cases which they have tried.
Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Chief Judge Harvey, judges from
the district and the circuit, I came to the federal court in Baltimore
in 1930. Judge Soper was about to move on to Richmond and,
therefore, Judge Coleman and Miss Stack were, in fact, the presiding
judges. Judge Coleman would tell her how he wanted a case de-
cided, and she wrote the opinion-some of which he became re-
nowned for, particularly in the area of patents.
Judge Coleman was also renowned for his dedication to the
great outdoors. His strict and fierce application of the law in duck-
hunting cases brought him an interstate reputation of such magni-
tude that it was rumored that the leaders of the flocks of mallards
and Canada geese would stop their flights before crossing the Mary-
land line, and with strong admonition to every member of the flock,
would see that each one then and there, carefully and gratefully,
genuflected.
Judge Soper was of a different ilk. His asperity was well known.
In fact, when he became bored (an attitude of federal judges of
which I have frequently been observant in the past sixty years), he
would swivel his chair and carefully study the reredos behind him.
I personally observed this on one occasion when counsel, a re-
tired judge from Oklahoma, was arguing that documents at issue in
the case were in fact ambiguous. Counsel was positive of that fact
because he, himself, had written those papers. Judge Soper turned
away from the reredos and directed his attention to counsel.
"Do I understand that you are contending that these docu-
ments are ambiguous and you are certain of this fact because you
yourself drew these papers?"
For the first time, counsel thought he had made his point, and
he agreed enthusiastically with the Judge. He was somewhat
abashed when Judge Soper next spoke.
* "Cookie" Boyd passed away shortly before this went to press. This Court will indeed miss
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"Well, counsel, if what you say is true, you have indeed created
a masterpiece of ambiguity."
But Judge Soper was not without his nemesis-this time on the
distaff side. He came home one night to the family's apartment on
39th Street and noticed on the hall table a shoe box. He asked
Auntie Soper what it was-you could only address her thusly if she
expressly invited you-and she replied that his opera shoes were
worn out, and the Metropolitan was coming to Baltimore next
Tuesday.
"But Grace, dear, the Fourth Circuit has invited me to sit with
them next Tuesday."
It did not take her long to respond.
"Morris Soper, to hell with the Fourth Circuit... we're going
to the opera."
And so they did.
Judge Chestnut was of different structure. He was small physi-
cally, but a judicial giant. He enjoyed greatly the history of the
court, but he had not a sparkle of humor in him-for diversion, he
enjoyed discussing the Vestry Act of 1798.
In court, of course, he preferred jury selection, where each
panel presented a captive audience for whom he would review the
history of the court. At the end of these lectures, he would ask a
single pointed question:
"Now, is there any one among you who would choose not to do
your duty as a member of this jury panel?"
Woe betide anyone who showed an inclination not to serve-
that is, except for one occasion.
He had finished his lecture to the panel and was making his
usual inquiry, when he noticed a disturbance in the courtroom un-
like any he had seen before. He could not understand what was be-
ing said, so he asked the disturbed individual to step out into the
aisle, and repeat himself. This the man tried to do, but only with
utter confusion:
"I ... I... I wish to be excused, because my wi... wife is about
to conceive."
Judge Chestnut paused for a moment, and then said, "I don't
understand. Perhaps you are trying to advise the court that your
wife is about to conceive-or is she about to give birth? But I have
decided to excuse you, for in either event, your place is with her."
Thank you.
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VII. THE 1960S AND 1970s
HONORABLE EDWARD S. NORTHROP
Senior Judge Edward S. Northrop is well known throughout
Maryland on both the state and the federal side of the law. He has
in the past served as majority leader in the State Senate and as chair-
man of its finance committee. He became a judge of this court in
1961 and he served as Chief Judge from 1970 to 1981. Judge
Northrop continues to maintain an active docket and we look for-
ward to hearing from him today.
Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist, distinguished guests, friends and
family.
Back in 1961, I came aboard as the sixteenth appointment in
the history of this bench." I joined then Chief Judge Thomsen,
Judge Watkins and Senior Judge Chesnut, in what was not exactly a
democratic organization. It might best be characterized as a benign
dictatorship.
Every week at a brown bag lunch, Judge Thomsen would assign
cases. Even in those days, there was no problem keeping busy. For
the most part, we handled typical federal cases: admiralty, steve-
dore and collision, diversity, antitrust, and patents. On very short
notice one might find oneself in Norfolk trying an admiralty case.
The criminal docket for some reason was replete with bank robbery
cases-one of the heaviest caseloads in the country. Despite this,
we were soon to look back on this experience as mildly challenging,
but entirely manageable and rather pleasant. Then came the deluge
of the mid-sixties.
Some have ascribed this unprecedented burgeoning of the fed-
eral caseload to an awakening of conscience. Whatever the impetus,
the tide began with the activism of the Supreme Court and the infer-
ior federal courts, reflected in the school decisions, the one-man
one-vote concept, and, generally, by judicial concern in areas previ-
ously left to the legislative branch. Next came the flood of executive
remedies which the Johnson administration whipped through a will-
ing, activist Congress.
The trend emphasized individual rights in every conceivable
field, and ascribed to the central government powers alien to the
concept of federalism. Everything became constitutional and sub-
ject to resolution in the federal courts. Judges examined the Consti-
113. See H.H.W. LEWIS &J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 60, at 163; THE AMERICAN BENCH,
JUDGES OF THE NATION 1165 (M. Hough 5th ed. 1989-90).
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tution from a host of new angles, not unlike the proverbial blind
men, each describing a different part of the elephant.
Thus, through a combination of judicial fiat, executively con-
structed power, and congressional excess, the federal judge had be-
come at once the most powerful figure in government and the
mucker of the Augean stables. Congress continued this trend
through the seventies by enacting at least ninety-four laws which
tended to increase the burden on the federal courts."
14
Near the end of the seventies, Judge Irving R. Kaufman
summed up the situation in the federal courts:
The roll call of causes dealt with by the judiciary
sounds like a litany of the most vexing questions in current
American political history: racial discrimination and segre-
gation, school admissions and affirmative action, busing,
free speech and political protest, internal and foreign se-
curity, the rights of criminal defendants, church-state rela-
tions from prayers in public schools to public funding for
parochial schools, legislative reapportionment, obscenity,
the draft, abortion, the death penalty, women's rights, and
ecology. Moreover, the complex subject matter of modern
statutes and Congress's tendency to legislate by exhort-
atory generality have propelled the courts into what may
appear to be an unaccustomed regulatory and quasi-legis-
lative role. Both the pettiest details and the broadest con-
cepts of government have come within the judicial ambit.
Ideally, the modern judge should be, as in the phrase
describing Justice Brandeis, a master of both microscope
and telescope. 115
Of course, the seething sixties, marked by campus unrest, ur-
ban riots and complex political disputes, spawned a plethora of liti-
gation. Also, an awakening in the private sector created an
avalanche of complex, protracted civil litigation.
It became increasingly clear that the system was simply not
equipped, in personnel or technique, to handle the enormous tasks
imposed by this confluence of factors. The federal judiciary needed
extraordinary measures to withstand the flood of litigation antici-
pated in the 1970s. After instigation by the judiciary, the obvious
114. For a list of the 94 laws, see Northrop, The Metamorphosis of a Federal Court, MD.
BJ. May 1981, at 7.
115. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE LJ. 681, 685 (1979) (footnotes
omitted).
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became apparent to Congress, and relief came in a series of meas-
ures that vastly altered the complexion of the federal courts.
One such measure was triggered by the onslaught of massive
antitrust suits. Faced with mind-boggling demands on their time,
federal judges met and conceived the machinery for streamlining
the management of these cases.' 16 Their plans culminated in Con-
gress's establishing the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation." 17
Also, the Federal Judicial Center, designed to research and test
new procedures, as well as to educate judges and court personnel,
was established in 1968'18 and gained momentum in the seventies.
The Center's educational seminars numbered around six in 1970
and climbed to 150 in 1980.119 Many of the Center's modernization
proposals have been implemented by district courts throughout the
country, including Maryland.120
In another key development, the Federal Magistrates' Act of
1968121 authorized the district courts to appoint magistrates. Over
the years, the volume of criminal cases handled by the magistrates
and the range of their civil jurisdiction has steadily grown. 122 Dis-
posing of hundreds of cases annually, the magistrates have become
an invaluable adjunct to this district court and to all district courts.
Similarly, the creation of the Land Commission 12 relieved dis-
trict judges of practically all the condemnation proceedings for the
C&O Canal Park, the National Parkway, and the Washington Area
Mass Transportation Authority.
Together, these new mechanisms and new judicial officers ena-
bled us to keep abreast of a civil caseload that rose ninety-four per-
cent between 1970 and 1980.124 Criminal filings increased by over
116. See E. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 89-92 (1987).
117. See Act of Apr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109-10 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)).
118. See Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 664, 664 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (1988)).
119. See 1970 FED. JUD. CENTER ANN. REP. TO THEJUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 21-23; 1980
FED. JUD. CENTER ANN. REP. 5-43.
120. See E. SURRENCY, supra note 116, at 90.
121. Federal Magistrates' Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1988)).
122. See E. SURRENCY, supra note 116, at 367-68.
123. See In re Land Condemnation Comm'n, Miscellaneous No. 998-A, at 8-9 (D. Md.
Nov. 3, 1976) (en banc) (creating a three-person commission to fix just compensation in
various federal condemnation proceedings pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure
71A(h)).
124. See 1970 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 234; 1980 id.
at 219.
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sixty percent, 125  while bankruptcy filings soared above 400
percent. 12 6
I have yet to mention the most striking additions: six new
judgeships between 1960 and 1980.127 The exponential growth of
the District Court of Maryland over the last few decades might best
be illustrated by one simple fact: more people have been appointed
to this bench since 1961 than in the entire preceding 170 years.1 28
I will not further belabor statistics. Let me just mention one
matter not reflected in the numbers for those years. Judge Thom-
sen was then immersed in the Penn Central Bankruptcy 29 and the
railroad reorganization. Two circuit judges sat with him, but it was
our judge who performed the legwork and handled the complicated
details of getting the railroads running again.
Sheer quantity, as impressive as it may be, does not tell the
whole story of the court in the sixties and seventies. This, after all,
was the era of the great civil rights cases, which irrevocably altered
our society. The question of obscenity preoccupied the court for
some time indicating the renewed vigor of first amendment de-
bates.' 30 A series of watershed decisions of enormous constitu-
tional import punctuated these two decades.
Perhaps though, it is the individual defendants we will best re-
member. I would be remiss if I failed to cite just a few of the most
notorious, such as the Mafia in the New York bond-stealing cases, or
the Berrigan Brothers, whose trial for destroying draft records
would become a sixties cause c6lbre.' 3 l It is also hard to forget
that the Vice President of the United States passed through this
court as a criminal defendant.' 32 These trials mirrored the turmoil
125. See 1970 id. at 270; 1980 id. at 417.
126. See 1970 id. at 299; 1980 id. at 548.
127. See 1960 id. at 371; 1980 id. at 621.
128. See H.H.W. LEWIS &J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 60, at 163.
129. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Trustees of Penn Central Transp. Co., 421 F.
Supp. 1047 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1976); Norwich & Worcester R.R. v. United
States, 408 F. Supp. 1398 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1976).
130. See, e.g., Modem Social Educ., Inc. v. Preller, 353 F. Supp. 173 (D. Md. 1973),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Age of Majority Educ. Corp. v. Preller, 512 F.2d
1241 (4th Cir. 1975); Star v. Preller, 352 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S.
904 (1973), on remand, 375 F. Supp. 1093, aff'd, 419 U.S. 956 (1974); Adler v.
Pomerleau, 313 F. Supp. 277 (D. Md. 1970).
131. See United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Md. 1968) (holding that
the reasonableness of defendants' belief of the illegality of the Vietnam War was irrele-
vant to charges of injuring United States property, mutilating public records, and hin-
dering the administration of the Selective Service Act).
132. See United States v. Agnew, 428 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (D. Md. 1977) (refusing to
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of the times and illustrated the federal court's position at the vortex
of society's most pressing concerns.
Of course, not all our cases were somber affairs. I once had to
order the police force to accept a nudist cadet, who had the highest
marks of his police academy class, despite the problems he might
have had with wearing his gun at all times.' The ruling prompted
Commissioner Pomerleau to remark on another occasion, "I know
Judge Northrop, but I don't recognize him with his clothes on."
I also did my share to rein in expanding judicial powers by re-
fusing to enjoin the suspension of student protestors at one time.' 34
I was not about to inject the court between the paddle and the
behind.
I'd like to close today with a brief prayer for federal judges bor-
rowed from a colleague in Georgia.
Dear Lord, on bended knee I pray you, tomorrow send
me a plain old tort case. Or if You can't do that, a suit on a
simple contract in writing will do just as well. That's a little
enough favor to ask even if I have gotten rusty on the com-
mon law since I've been on this Court.
And deliver me, oh Lord, from any 2254s or 1981s,
1983s, 1985s or any 2000s (a-e, inclusive). You got trou-
bles, I know, enforcing Chapter 20 subsections 3-17, inclu-
sive, of the Book of Exodus. But it can't be much worse
than what we federal judges have under Title 42. And if
You care about me, Lord, don't send me any class actions,
whatever they are.
It's not that I mind work. You know me better than
that, Lord. It's just that I'm not a pedagogist, penologist,
theologist, sociologist, cosmetologist, tonsorialist .... liter-
ary censor or personnel director.
And another thing, please don't put me on any more
three-judge courts. Lord knows, I got enough trouble
agreeing with myself-much less trying to convince two
other [damn] fools.
revoke defendant's probation, entered after nolo contendere plea to charge of tax
evasion).
133. See Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 69 (D. Md. 1970) (holding that the
police department could not constitutionally refuse to accept a nudist's application for
the position of probationary patrolman without showing a paramount governmental in-
terest that would justify intrusion on first amendment rights).
134. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 325 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (D. Md. 1970) (no consti-
tutional state action after the Board of Education stayed an order regulating dissemina-
tion of nonschool publications on school grounds), aff'd, 439 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1971).
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Now, Lord, I'm not trying to run Your business. But
some day You've got to put an end to the invidious dis-
crimination against me and give me the equal protection of
the Ten Commandments and all the recent amendments
thereto.
And one more thing, Lord. Watch your step. I've got
news for You. You've got real competition down in this
section. The first thing You know the... Court of Appeals
is going to permanently enjoin You from this discrimina-
tion against me. Of course, I realize there's a question of
service on You under the long-arm statute. But let me
warn you-that's not going to bother the [circuit court]
very much. 13 5
135. A. Lawrence, Address to Atlanta Bar Association (Mar. 17, 1971), reprinted in A.
LAWRENCE, TONGUE IN CHEEK 67-68 (1979).
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VIII. 1984 WASN'T So BAD AFTER ALL
HONORABLE FRANK A. KAUFMAN
Senior Judge Frank A. Kaufman became a district judge in
1966 and served as Chief Judge from 1981 to 1986. Known for
his boundless energy, Judge Kaufman continues to be active in the
American Bar Association and in the Federal Judges Association. At
the present time, he is the district judge representative of the Fourth
Circuit serving as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
Chief Justice, as Chief Judge Harvey stated at the beginning of
this proceeding, all of us here today are certainly most honored and
privileged by your presence.
Also, sir, we certainly hope you are most comfortable and that
my robe is not causing you problems of the type which Judge Har-
vey and I encountered one day during our early tenure, when we
mistakenly donned each others' robes and proceeded into two dif-
ferent courtrooms-and he swam in mine and I struggled in his. We
can, in any event, assure you, Chief Justice, that there will be no
dissenting opinion filed in response to your remarks, despite the
fact that you are joined today by fifteen other robed federal judicial
officers instead of the eight in whose company you are usually
found.
The title of my remarks, "1984 Wasn't So Bad After All," may
have provoked the question: "What does the reference to the year
1984 mean?" George Orwell is hardly a household name to many
of the younger persons present this afternoon. But when Orwell's
best-selling novel entitled 1984 '36 was published nearly a half-cen-
tury ago, it was almost compulsory reading and it sent chills through
its readers. The chills were caused by Orwell's prediction that in
fifty years, we would each be living under the aegis and domination
of Big Brother; that is, that an all-pervasive dictatorship would flour-
ish through the utilization of scientific technology.
Orwell wrote that in 1984 each of us would live day and night
under scrutiny from central watchers who would observe and listen
to us during our every waking and sleeping moment through con-
stantly open two-way "telescreens."1 37 Today's technology has not
yet advanced as far as Orwell predicted in 1984, but it has come
close. And yet in this country, under our Constitution, we continue
136. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
137. Id. at 6.
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to control use of electronic eavesdropping and other intrusions into
our privacy. Our Constitution allows us to recognize the clash be-
tween governmental and societal interests on the one hand, and the
individual's privacy on the other; to balance among them; and to
respect and even to enhance the freedoms and human values we
have inherited.
In at least one respect, however, we federal district judges have
been overcome by modern technology. I refer to the computerized
sentencing mandated by Congress.13 But we are a resilient group
and somehow we shall survive and live to prevail another day.13 9 If
we are so to prevail, however, we will need to remember the lessons
of the past. When I became a member of the bar of Maryland in
1940, there were two judges on this court-Chief Judge Coleman
and Judge Chesnut. It was said in those days that there were two
judges over there on Calvert Street-one who couldn't count over
five when he sentenced in criminal cases and one who couldn't
count less than five in sentencings. So, all was not necessarily per-
fect in those days.
Indeed, in many ways, all Americans have a lot to accomplish in
another day. We have not yet attained a perfect society, not by any
means. We still must eliminate many economic and social dispari-
ties. We still must learn to live together without discrimination
based upon race or sex. Nevertheless, we lead the way in showing to
the world that we still believe in and practice the desires and aims of
the authors of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion of the United States. As the decade of the 1990s begins, and
the remarkable and unbelievable changes occur in Eastern Europe
and, to some extent, in South Africa, all of us-judges, court staff,
jurors, and members of the bar-in our daily devotion to the rule of
law, continue to adhere to the traditions of our founding fathers and
of those who have preceded us in the last two hundred years.
In this court, after I succeeded Judge Northrop as Chief Judge
in 1981, and then as Chief Judge Harvey followed me in 1986, the
expansion of the caseload and the increase in number ofjudges con-
tinued. Judges Black, Hargrove, Motz, Smalkin, Niemeyer, and
138. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-80 (1988)). See
generally Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV.
83 (1988).
139. See Excerpts of William Faulkner's speech upon receiving the Nobel Prize, Dec.
10, 1950, quoted in BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 838 (15th ed. 1980) ("I believe that
man will not merely endure: he will prevail.").
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Garbis joined us-Judge Nickerson soon will. Remarkably, the en-
largement of our court has not disturbed our collegiality. We re-
main, as we were when Judge Harvey and I came aboard in 1966, a
happy, communicative group-with each judge willing to pitch in
and aid another, with judges reaching what is euphemistically called
"retirement" age continuing to handle heavy loads as senior judges,
and with new judges becoming quickly acclimated. And, of course,
we could not come close to keeping our heads above water if we did
not have such dedicated, hard-working, and able staff members in
our respective chambers, in the clerk's and marshal's offices, in pro-
bation and pretrial services, and among our court reporters and au-
dio operators.
We live today in a society far different than Orwell, writing in
the wake of World War II, envisaged would exist in 1984. But that
does not mean that our present form of government will be with us
fifty years from now, in the year 2040, or two hundred years from
now, in the year 2190. Two hundred years is a short time in history.
Think of it this way: Judge Northrop and I each have lived more
than one-third of the two hundred years which have elapsed since
1790.
Since the astronauts visited the Moon, that way station seems
just around the corner-as opposed to Jupiter and Saturn which
seem far out there in the universe. To most of you, the year 2190
seems just as far away as Jupiter and Saturn. But 2190 will arrive all
too quickly-and when it does, let us hope that in these United
States of America-and elsewhere in the world-our descendants
will have built upon and improved our traditions and our values. As
for the present, let us enjoy and respect those traditions and values,
and count our blessings that we have inherited from our outstand-
ing predecessors.
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IX. THE FUTURE FROM A PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
PAMELA J. WHITE
We will now hear from Pamela J. White, Esquire, a partner in
the Baltimore law firm of Ober, Kaler, Grimes and Shriver. Ms.
White is the past president of the Women's Bar Association and is an
active practitioner in this court, specializing in civil litigation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Chief Judge Harvey, members of this
bench and distinguished guests:
Given the rich history, the traditions, and the achievements of
this court over the past two hundred years, it is a bit overwhelming
to contemplate the challenges to come over the next two hundred
years. That, however, is the key to the future of our court-the ab-
solute certainty that our court, even as it adapts to meet current cri-
ses and the millennium's new tasks, will continue to thrive and
achieve justice.
Our task to address the future of the court is advanced by the
recent report of the Federal Courts Study Committee. 140 That com-
mittee identified many of the challenges that face our court and our
Congress, at least in the near term.' 4 ' Nevertheless, I will venture a
somewhat divergent view of the future, based on a practitioner's ex-
perience before this court and an appreciation of its rich history.'
4 2
The war on drugs will be advanced through the considerable
efforts of our bench, but a civil trial will become a rare privilege.
The crisis of our judiciary's drug and criminal docket overload, ex-
acerbated by the Sentencing Guidelines, 43 eventually will abate.
140. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
(1990) [hereinafter REPORT]; see also FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., TENTATIVE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (Dec. 22, 1989).
141. The issues addressed included: reallocating business between the state and fed-
eral systems, REPORT supra note 140 at 35-54; creating nonjudicial forums for matters
currently in the federal courts, id. at 55-68; creating judicial capacity within the judicial
branch, id. at 69-88; expediting litigation, id. at 89-108; easing the appellate caseload
crisis, id. at 109-32; reviewing the sentencing guidelines, id. at 133-44; administering
the federal courts, id. at 145-66; and protecting against bias and discrimination in the
judicial branch, id. at 167-70. State-court studies also have addressed such problems.
E.g., 1989-1988 ANN. REP. MD. JUDICIARY (1990); COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF VA. JUDI-
CIAL SYS., COURTS IN TRANSITION (1989); see also Address to the General Assembly on the
State of the Judiciary by ChiefJudge Robert C. Murphy (Jan. 12, 1990), reprinted in, The
Daily Record (Baltimore), Jan. 24, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
142. See generally W. Rrrz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (L.
LaRue & W. Holt ed. 1990); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49 (1923).
143. See supra note 138.
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But the cost will be measured both in judicial burnout and, more
tangibly, in new judicial appointments. 144
Our court will be a critical participant in a successful drug war,
but it will not sacrifice individual rights and will not act at the ex-
pense of cooperative relations with federal, state, and local prosecu-
tors. At the same time, it is apparent that the crisis in our courts will
not be resolved without global solutions and congressional recogni-
tion of the need for global remedies instead of shortsighted
adjustments.
With or without the elimination of diversity jurisdiction, the ad-
miralty and civil docket that remains in the new century will require
attorneys to be better managers than advocates. The fine traditions
of the admiralty proctors will yield to case management and special-
ized skills in multi-national corporate disputes, complex environ-
mental claims, and massive product litigation.
Technological advances will improve access to our courts and
may enhance the quality ofjustice, but the breadth of the computer-
ized database cannot substitute for scholarly research, innovative
analysis, or judicial common sense.
Consumer and domestic commercial disputes will benefit by in-
stitutionalized vehicles for alternative dispute resolution (ADR), but
we must expand ADR to avoid our court's collapse under the weight
of thousands of mass-tort and product claims. Eventually, the mem-
bers of this and our state benches, combined with our magistrates,
will be instrumental in promoting systematic ADR to overcome the
crush of those cases.
From challenges of employment discrimination to prisoners'
rights cases, from Social Security appeals to Jones Act' 45 compensa-
tion cases, the role of state courts, administrative agencies, and arbi-
tration will expand. The remaining docket of this court, however,
must not be devoted to adjudicating attorney's fees and discovery
disputes. Nor can we tolerate excessive delays and the mounting
costs of litigation which put justice out of reach for most of our
citizens.
The tradition of excellence of our bench will not yield to adju-
dicate warfare between counsel, but it expects and demands that at-
torneys appearing before this court will exhibit only the highest
144. See REPORT, supra note 140, at 160.
145. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
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qualities of professionalism.' 46 We must have hope that Congress
will respond to the critical needs of our court but, in the meantime,
we cannot submit or stand witness to any loss of collegiality, profes-
sionalism, and goodwill when we appear before this court. Even as
we face profound changes in the way attorneys deal with each other,
and in the way our citizens seek and secure justice, the men and
women appearing before this court must continue to champion our
fundamental civil rights without loss of intensity or constitutional
vigilance.
The strength and vitality of this court cannot be compromised
by inadequate compensation, poorer facilities or working condi-
tions, or insufficient support staff. Its collegiality must and will be
maintained even with the expansion of its numbers. Our perception
of fairness and the diversity of our bench must and will be enhanced
by the addition of women to this court.' 47 Our confidence and re-
spect for the quality of this bench will be renewed with the court's
continued vigilance to eliminate any appearance of bias in all judi-
cial proceedings, in the court's administration, and in the judicial
nominations process. 48
The strength of this court is a function of its traditions and its
continuity only so long as that continuity also reflects its ability to
adapt to meet new challenges. The successful performance of our
federal court as it responds in this new decade to the intense pres-
sure of the drug crisis, or as it serves our citizens from a significantly
altered jurisdictional basis, will determine the court's character and
viability in the new century.
It is difficult to comprehend the magnitude of society's ad-
vances in science, technology, medicine, and communications over
the last ten years, let alone in the next century. Our court has coped
with these changes, but has remained accessible and responsive to
the congressional expansion of its duties as well as to our citizens'
changing needs and expectations.
Just as this court recognizes that change is critical to progress,
the obligation of this bar to keep pace with changing circumstances
146. See Merhige, Professionalism, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: BUSINESS, JOURNALISM,
LAW, MEDICINE 50 (L. Hodges ed. 1989).
147. See MD. SPECIAL JOINT COMM., GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 94 (1989) (recom-
mending, based on survey research, appointment of qualified women at all levels in the
Maryland state court system).
148. See generally id.; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990) ("A
judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently."); id., Canon
2-C ("A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.").
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cannot be avoided. Oliver Wendell Holmes described our obliga-
tion as practitioners before this court:
Law is the business to which our lives are devoted, and
we should show less than devotion if we did not do what in
us lies to improve it, and, when we perceive what seems to
us the ideal of its future, if we hesitate to point it out and to
press toward it with all of our heart.'4 9
Thank you.
149. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473-74 (1897).
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X. CLOSING REMARKS: JUSTICE CHASE'S CHARGE
TO THE GRAND JURY*
HONORABLE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST
Our final speaker this afternoon will be the ChiefJustice of the
United States, the Honorable William H. Rehnquist. The Chief
Justice was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1971 and he became
Chief Justice in September of 1986. He has made our bicentennial
celebration a very special occasion by honoring us with his presence
and by addressing us here today. It is with great pleasure that I
present to you the Chief Justice of the United States.
Thank you, ChiefJudge Harvey. Judicial colleagues, ladies and
gentlemen.
It is a great honor to be here with you this afternoon and par-
ticipate in the celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the
first sitting of this court.
I want to say a few words this afternoon about Samuel Chase,
who was not, strictly speaking, a judge of the district court, but who
sat upon this bench many times in his capacity as circuit justice.
President George Washington appointed him to the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1796. In those days, the Supreme
Court managed to do its business in about six weeks of sitting in
February and early March. So, the rest of the time the Justices rode
circuit, sitting with the resident district judge of a court, the two
together constituting the circuit court for that district. Chase was a
Marylander, and his circuit took in the courts in Baltimore, Annapo-
lis, Philadelphia, Richmond, and Newcastle (which was then the cap-
ital of Delaware).
It was from the bench of this court that Chase delivered a
charge to the grand jury sitting here in May 1803, by which he un-
wittingly carved a niche in American history for himself. He was a
Federalist, as were all of the appointees of Federalist Presidents
George Washington and John Adams-which, from the perspective
$ Parts of this speech are drawn from: H. ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA DURING THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1898); 3 A.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919); 1 B. CABELL, JOHN RANDOLPH OF
ROANOKE 1773-1833 (1970); P. CLARKSON & R.S. JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND
(1970); R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC (1971); 4 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME-JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT:
FIRST TERM, 1801-1805 (1970); W. STORY, THE LIFE AND LETIERS OF JOSEPH STORY
(London 1851); TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE (S. Smith & T. Lloyd ed., Washington, D.C.
1805 & photo. reprint 1970); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY (1923).
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of two hundred years perhaps illustrates the French proverb, "plus
a change, plus c'est la mbne chose."
This was at a time when judges were far less circumspect than
they are now about mixing in politics. But Chase was a partisan
even by the standards of his own times. The start of the term of the
Supreme Court in August, 1800, had to be postponed for several
days because of his absence while he was stumping the State of
Maryland for the reelection of President John Adams.
But in the election of 1800, John Adams was defeated by
Thomas Jefferson in what historians call the "Second American
Revolution." Jefferson and his Republican party gained control not
only of the presidency, but of both Houses of Congress.
By 1803 it was evident that the times, they were a-changing, and
Samuel Chase did not like what he saw. Congress had repealed the
so-called "Midnight Judges" law passed in the last days of the
Adams administration and populist sentiment in Maryland estab-
lished a new state constitution which broadened the franchise. So,
when Chase was charging the grand jury, he said:
You know, gentlemen, that our state and national insti-
tutions were framed to secure to every member of the soci-
ety equal liberty and equal rights; but the late alteration of
the federal judiciary, by the abolition of the office of the
sixteen circuit judges, and the recent change in our state
constitution by the establishing of universal suffrage ...
will, in my judgment, take away all security for property
and personal liberty .... The change of the state constitu-
tion will, in my opinion, certainly and rapidly destroy all
protection to property, and all security to personal liberty;
and our republican constitution will sink into a mobocracy,
the worst of all possible governments.
A spectator at these proceedings sent a newspaper account of
them to President Thomas Jefferson, who promptly wrote to Joseph
Nicholson, another Marylander in the House of Representatives.
Jefferson said:
Ought this seditious and official attack on the princi-
ples of our Constitution, and on the proceedings of a state,
to go unpunished? And to whom so pointedly as yourself
will the public look for the necessary measures? I ask these
questions for your consideration. For myself it is better
that I should not interfere.
The poet Byron described his heroine Julia as "Whispering 'I
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will ne'er consent'-consented." Here we have the political
equivalent: Jefferson, saying he would never interfere, interfered.
Nicholson did not respond to Jefferson's urging, but his fellow
Republican, John Randolph of Roanoke, did, and in 1804, the
House of Representatives impeached Samuel Chase in a series of
seven articles, one of which was devoted to the charge given by
Chase to the Baltimore grand jury. The trial before the Senate took
place in February 1805. Chase was represented by a galaxy of able
lawyers, headed by his old friend, Luther Martin of Baltimore.
Chase at this time was sixty-four years of age, more than six feet
tall and correspondingly broad, it is said. His complexion was
brownish-red in color, earning him the name of "Old Bacon Face."
He was born in Somerset County, on the Eastern Shore, but at
the age of eighteen he had gone to Annapolis to study law. He was
an early and spirited participant in the American Revolution. He
was one of the organizers of the Sons of Liberty in Maryland in
1766. He was a delegate to the first Continental Congress. Largely
through his efforts, the Maryland legislature had instructed its dele-
gation to the Continental Congress to vote for complete indepen-
dence from England in July of 1776. He was a signer of the
Declaration of Independence, but twelve years later he opposed
Maryland's ratification of the Constitution because it contained no
bill of rights.
He had a distinguished and successful career at the Maryland
bar. In 1791, he became chiefjudge of the Maryland General Court.
Justice Joseph Story of the Supreme Court described Chase as the
"living image" of Samuel Johnson, "in person, in manners, in un-
wieldy strength, severity of reproof, in real tenderness of heart, and
above all, in intellect."
Chase's principal defense counsel, Luther Martin, was his long-
time friend at the Maryland bar. Luther Martin was surely one of
the great lawyers in American history, an ornament of the Maryland
bar, and one of the great iconoclasts of the American legal profes-
sion. Because of his fondness for strong drink, his detractors re-
ferred to him as the "lawyer brandy bottle."
Martin was the first Attorney General of Maryland and served in
that office for more than twenty-eight years. He suffered a paralytic
stroke shortly after arguing the case of McCulloch v. Maryland before
the Supreme Court in 1819, but he lived on for seven years, help-
less, without family and without means of support. The Maryland
legislature took notice of his condition and unanimously enacted a
truly remarkable statute: every lawyer admitted to practice in the
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State of Maryland was required to pay annually to the clerk of the
court in the county in which he practiced the sum of five dollars,
which sums were turned over to trustees for the use and benefit of
Luther Martin.
The Senate which would try Chase was presided over by the
Vice President of the United States, who was then Aaron Burr. Burr
himself was a fugitive from justice at the time: in the summer of
1804 he had shot and killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel at Wee-
hawken, New Jersey, and an indictment for murder had issued
against him in that state. This led one wag to remark that whereas
in most courts the murderer was arraigned before the judge, in this
court the judge was arraigned before the murderer.
The thirty-four senators who were to sit in judgment upon
Chase heard testimony from numerous witnesses and unbelievably
long arguments from counsel on all sides.
Finally, on March 1, 1805, they voted on each of the charges
and Chase was acquitted. The largest number of votes for convic-
tion came on the count dealing with his charge to the Baltimore
grand jury, but even on that charge there were only nineteen who
voted guilty as opposed to fifteen who voted not guilty. Since a two-
thirds majority was required by the Constitution, Chase remained a
federal judge.
The relationship between Chase and Martin was an interesting
one. A few years after his successful defense of Chase, Martin ap-
peared before him sitting as a circuit judge here in Baltimore, and
Martin was visibly intoxicated. Chase said to him, "I am surprised
that you can so prostitute your talents." Whereupon, Martin, draw-
ing himself up as a straight as he could, replied to Chase, "Sir, I
never prostituted my talents except when I defended you and Colo-
nel Burr."
And then, turning to the jury, he added, sotto voce, "Confiden-
tially, a couple of the greatest rascals in the world."
Chase angrily instructed the clerk to draw up a citation of Mar-
tin for contempt of court, but when it was presented for his signa-
ture, that choleric old man, recollecting their forty-year friendship
and all that he owed Martin, put the quill pen back in its holder,
saying, "This hand could never sign a citation against Luther
Martin."
Chase was an able lawyer, but he lacked what is called a judicial
temperament. He was impatient with counsel who appeared before
him, and on many occasions he heckled counsel. A historian of the
bar of the circuit of which Chase served described him as "a man of
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ripe legal learning, but of an arbitrary spirit; from the beginning he
was unpopular with the Philadelphia bar, owing to his despotic man-
ner on the bench."
The writer then goes on to relate a colloquy which occurred
between Chase and Samuel Leake, an attorney from Trenton, New
Jersey, who was appearing before Chase for the first time.
Leake was thought remarkable for the number of authorities to
which he customarily referred in an argument, and upon this occa-
sion he had brought a considerable portion of his library into court,
and was arranging the books upon the table at the time that Chase
came on the bench. The following colloquy then took place:
"What books have you got there, sir?" asked Justice Chase.
"My books, sir," Leake responded.
"What for?"
"To cite my authorities."
"To whom?"
"To your honor."
"I'll be damned if you do."
Chase served as a Justice of the Supreme Court after his acquit-
tal until his death in 1811. He was an able lawyer; he probably
never should have been appointed to the bench, certainly not as a
trial judge, because of his temperament.
His acquittal by the Senate was probably the single most impor-
tant event in the history of the United States by way of assuring the
independence of the federal judiciary. The Senate wisely decided
that it was preferable to put up with a judge who lacked a judicial
temperament than to risk the removal of federal judges for political
reasons. And when you think that the case all began here with his
charge to the grand jury in 1803, it seems to me it is fitting to take
note of that today.
I thank you for having allowed me to participate.
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